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Many  features  incorporated  in  the  Food  and  tion in acreage  of these  crops showed up as increases
Agriculture  Act  of  1965  were  previously  tested  for  in  acreages  of feed grains, soybeans, forage crops, and
feed  grain  and  wheat  but  used  little,  if  at  all,  for  fallow.  Stocks  of major  crops  held by  CCC  rose for
controlling  production and-supporting  incomes  from  several  years  as prices generally  were supported above
cotton.  The  Act 'included  additional  provisions  market  equilibrium  prices by nonrecourse loans from
specifically  applicableto cotton. The following analy-  the Commodity Credit Corporation.
sis is directed toward appraising the effects of the Act 
on  cotton  production,  on  the  income  of  cotton  By  1961,  the  emergency  feed  grain  programs
producers, and on Government  costs.  - brought  about  the  first  change  toward the  programs
that  were  later  included  in  the  1965  legislation.
- HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  Although  prices  were  supported  at  relatively  high
levels,  land taken  out of feed grain could not be used
for  production  of other  crops.  In  1962,  the first step
The  Agriculture  Act  of  1965  marked  a  major  ^  toward  lower  price  supports  was  made  by  reducing
change in  the emphasis of farm  programs.  It was the  the  loan rate  for wheat  and making up the difference
first  legislation  to  officially recognize  (by legislation  by  a price  support  payment.  For  1964, this principle
for: a 4-year  program) that the surplus  production  of  was applied  to feed grains and the loan rate for wheat
specific.  commodities. was  not  as  temporary  problem  was further reduced,  while the price  support payment
that  could  be  solved  with  temporary  programs.It  rate  was  raised,  as  well  as  extending  the  program
took cognizance  of the desirability  of allowing prices  through  1965.  Thus,  all  of the  features  of the  pro-
to respond to changes in supply  and market  demand.  gram  had  been  tested  as  they  applied  to  feed  grain
The  Act  also  reflected  the  need  for  reducing  the  and  wheat  by  the  time  the  1965  Act  waspassed.
amount  of resources  used  in production  of surplus  However,'  none  of these  program  provisions,  except
crops. Although this fact was also reflected in the Soil  relatively low price  support payments in exchange for  relatively low price support payments in exchange
Bank  program  of  theX 1-950's  and  in  the  emergency  for diversion  in  1964 and  1965,  had been tested rela-
feed  grain  programs  of  1961-65,  the Soil.Bank  pro-  tive to cotton andthe  need forimmediate actionleft
grams were allowed  to  lapse  an  d  the  emergency.  feed  little  time for advance  analysis of their application to
grain  programs  still  reflected  the  idea  that  surpluses  cotton. Withstocks ofcottonapproachingthe  equiva-
were temporary.  ........-  . . .......  lent of a  2-year  supply,  the need  to do something to
restrict a:further buildup in stocks'was urgent.
The  earlier acreage  allotment  programs encouraged
producers  to restrict  production  of specified crops  in  As  a result  of the  1965  Act,  the  feed  grain  and
exchange  for prices supported at relatively  high levels.  wheat programs  beginning in 1966 remained  essential-
Land  use  on  each  farm  could  be shifted from  allot-  ly as they were  in  1964  and  1965,  but in  the cotton
ment  crops  to  other'  crops.  Production  of  wheat,  program  there were  notable changes from the acreage
cotton,  tobacco,  peanuts,  and  rice  was restricted  by  allotment  and  relatively  high  price  support  program
allotments  and marketing  quotas.  Most of the  reduc-  that prevailed  through' 1965.  ' 
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77EFFECT OF THE 1965 ACT ON  ments  were  computed  frequently  exceeded  the
FEED GRAINS, WHEAT, AND COTTON  acreage  harvested  and  sometimes  exceeded  the acre-
age planted (Table  1).
Although  the  Agriculture  Act  of  1965  provided
similar programs  for feed  grains, wheat,  and cotton,  In  1966,  the  total  acreage  for  price  support  ex-
the  application  to the three commodities  were quite  ceeded  the  acreage  harvested  in  Florida,  Georgia,
different.  For  one  reason,  diversion  started  from  Illinois,  Kentucky,  Missouri, Nevada,  North Carolina,
different  bases.  Diversion  of wheat  and  cotton was  Oklahoma,  South  Carolina,  Texas,  and  Virginia.  In
from  current  allotments,  while  diversion  of  feed  1967,  the  total  acreage  receiving  price  support  ex-
grains  was from the average acreage harvested in  1959  ceeded  acres harvested  in 15  of 19 States with cotton
to 1960.  allotments; in  1968,  it was  7 of  19.  Although one of
the  requirements for price support payments was that
Wheat  and  cotton  allotments had  been  in  effect  the acreage  must have been'planted, many farmers,  in
since  1954.  By  1966,  when  the  1965  Act  became  other  States,  likely  received  price  support payments
effective,  acreages  of these  crops had  been  reduced  on more acreage than was harvested.
considerably  below  preallotment  years.  However,
feed grain bases were based on acreages in years when  The average  of yields that were used as a basis for
production  was  unrestricted  and  when  acreages  of  computing payments exceeded  Stateaverage  yields of
feed  grains  probably  reflected  shifts  to  these  crops  cotton produced  in all States and years from 1966 to
from  crops  restricted  by  allotments.  Furthermore,  1968  except  one,  and that  was  in  Nevada  in  1968
upward  adjustments  were  made  in many  individual  (Table  2).  In  some  States  and  years,  these  yields
feed grain bases  prior to the time the  1965 Act went  exceeded  actual yields  by as much  as 50 percent. On
into effect  so  that by  1966 the aggregate  feed grain  a  national  average  basis,  they exceeded actual  yields
bases  were  several  million  acres  greater  than  the  by 48 pounds per acre in 1968,69 pounds per acre in
average  acreage  in  the  base  years,  1959-60.  Current  1966, and 129 pounds per acre in 1967.
bases  also  reflect  base  acreages  released  with  the
expiration  of  Conservation  Reserve  agreements.  At  least  four  factors  contributed  to  the  above
Similar  acreages  are  included  in  wheat  and  cotton  disparity  between  actual  yields  and  those  used  as  a
allotments.  basis  for payments.  Unfavorable weather, particularly
in  1967,  held  actual  yields  considerably  below
Even  though  the  1967 and  1968 Wheat Programs  normal.  The  relatively  low  price  of  cotton  dis-
and  the  1969  Cotton  Program  did  not  provide  for  couraged  gleaning  the  last few pounds per  acre.  The
diversion  from  allotments,  part  of the wheat  certifi-  reduction  in  the  amount  of labor  used  to  produce
cate  payments  and cotton price support payments in  cotton also  tended to reduce  yields,  as farmers rapid-
those years were proxies for diversion payments; that  ly  shifted  from  hand  hoeing  to  chemical  weed
is, if acreages had exceeded  allotments, farmers would  control.  In some cases, the change  resulted in weedier
not have been  eligible  for income  support payments,  fields  and  lower  yields.  In  others,  the  chemicals  re-
and,  in the case  of cotton, penalties would have been  tarded the growth of cotton as well as that of weeds.
imposed for exceeding allotments.  Part  of  the  detrimental  effect  of the  chemicals  re-
suited from farmers'  inexperience  with chemical weed
It could be rationalized  that an attempt was made  control  and the  consequent  application of too much
through administrative  interpretations to equalize the  or  too  little,  or  application  under  improper  condi-
program  effects  on  the  three  commodities.  For  tions.  On  the  other hand,  sale  and lease and release
example,  under  the  feed grain programs,  farmers  are  and  reapportionment  of allotments  tended  to  raise
required  to divert 20 percent of their feed grain bases  both  the  actual  yields  and  those  used  to  compute
to be eligible for price support payments.  Theoretical-  payments  because  allotments usually  were moved to
ly, intention  was  to constrain  output  comparable  to  better land.
the reduction  in allotments of wheat and cotton, but,
in  effect,  the price support  payments  became  a pay-  Perhaps,  the  change  in technique  from hand hoe-
ment for minimum diversion.  ing  to  chemical  weed  control  was  not  sufficiently
recognized  by the USDA yields projection committee
COTTON  PROGRAMS UNDER THE 1965 ACT  in estimating projected  yields. Thus, the U.S. average
projected  yield  of 545  pounds,  used  as  a  starting
Under  cotton  programs  prior  to  1966,  cotton  point in assigning  farm yields, was too high and these
producers  received price support loans only for actual  estimates  were  reflected  in  the  yields  used  in  com-
production,  but  under  the  1965  Act,  as  things  puting  payments.  But  the  practice  of  permitting
worked  out  in  practice,  they  commonly  received  individual  farmers  to be paid  on the basis of "proven
price  support  payments  for  more  cotton  than  was  yields,"  when  these  could  be  established  without  a
produced.  The  acreages  for which price support  pay-  downward  adjustment  in  yields  on  other  farms,  re-
78TABLE  1.  COTTON ACREAGES PLANTED,  HARVESTED,  AND  RECEIVING  PRICE SUPPORT PAYMENTS,  1966-1968
1966  1967  . 1968
- Acres for  '  Acres for  Acresfor
State  Ares  Acres  price  Acres  Acres  price  Acres  Acres  price
planted  harvested  support  planted  harvested  support  planted  harvested  support
payment  payment  payment
1,000 acres
Alabama  589  564  554  513  340  532  555  525  530
Arizona  255  252  212  248  245  213  298  296  211
Arkansas  930  865  834  830  715  829  1,045  980  825
California  632  618  467  595  588  474  "  695:'  687  474
Florida  --  14.3  14.8  ---  10.0  11.8  13.4  .12.5  12.7
Georgia  403  380  398  335  267  346  410  395  387
Illinois  ---  0.5  1.8  ----  0.2  1.7  2.0  0.3  1.8
Kentucky  ---  2.5  4.3  --  0.9  4.3  5.0  3.7  4.3
Louisiana  367  357  342  348  330  337  423  410  338
Mississippi  1,032  993  957  955  890  945  1,155  1,105  945
Missouri  255  190  231  245  90  226  318  190  231
Nevada  ---  2.2  2.3  ---  2.2  2.2  2.5  2.4  2.2
New Mexico  142  134  108  132  122  109  162  152  109
North Carolina  244  155  231  191  75  190  206  195  192
Oklahoma  447  380  431  425  370  428  425  385  433
South Carolina  355  305  342  307  190  304  354  340  325
Tennessee  398  '365  339  336  236  340  '  394  365  340
Texas  4,265  3,968  3,990  3,960  3,525  3,904  4450  4,125  3,961
Virginia  ---  . 6.1  9.6  ---  0.6  8.5  8.2  6.0  7.8
Total  10,349  9,552  9,468  9,448  7,997  9,203  10,921  10,175  9,329 
No  :  •X  '_____________________________suited in payments based  on yields that exceeded the  parity;  whereas,  the  average  price  of  cotton  rose
official projections.  considerably  above  the  loan  rate.  Thus,  instead  of
receiving  65  percent  of  parity  for  the  cotton  pro-
The  Food and  Agriculture  Act  of 1965  provided  duced,  farmers received  from 74 percent of parity for
that  the  total  price  for  permitted  production  of  the 1966 crop to 97 percent in 1967 (Table  3).
cotton  could  not  be  less  than  65  percent  of parity.
Permitted  production  was interpreted  to include  the  The  increase  in price support payments  since  1966
potential  production  on  acreage  voluntarily  diverted  reflects  the increases in parity prices of cotton which,
for payment.  in  turn, reflect  the rise in the parity  index.  In  1966,
the price  support payment was 9.42 cents per pound.
Although  the  loan  rate  was  set  at  a  realistic  21  In  1967,  this was  raised  to  11.53  cents  per  pound.
cents  per  pound  for  the  1966  crop,  it  was  further  Part of the increase (0.75 cents) was due to the reduc-
reduced for  the  1967 and succeeding  crops despite  a  tion in the loan rate, but with no change  in roan rate,
sharp reduction  in the supply. The price support pay-  the  price  support  payment  rose  to  12.24  cents  and
ment  rate  was raised accordingly, to keep the total of  14.73  cents per pound in  1968 and 1969, respective-
price  support payment plus loan rate at 65 percent of  ly.  A further increase in 1970 is likely.
TABLE  2.  COMPARISON  OF COTTON  YIELDS  ON  WHICH'PRICE SUPPORT  PAYMENTS  WERE BASED
AND  ACTUAL  COTTON YIELDS,  BY  STATES,  1966-1968
1966  1967  1968
Excess of  Excess of  Excess of Average of  Average of
yields  projected  yprojected  yields  projected yields  '  yields  y
State  used as  yields over  usedas  yields over  usedas  yields over
basis for  yields per  bayields  pyields  per  basis for  yields per basis for  ^ ^  basis for  ^  PJ  basis for
harvested  harvested  harvested payments  payments  payments
acre  acre  acre
Pounds per acre
Alabama  525  133  564  282  541  171
Arizona  1,170  191  1,179  292  1,207  56
Arkansas  620  202  644  311  595  91
California  1,164  212  1,173  326  1,156  84
Florida  416  80  448  112  456  68
Georgia  497  99  540  132  516  194
Illinois  533  179  563  318  500  20
Kansas  237  ---  257  ---  248
Kentucky  672  147  671  349  646  49
Louisiana  622  20  629  8  634  2
Mississippi  694  41  742  175  730  70
Missouri  627  219  622  308  588  95
Nevada  915  102  889  22  844  -36
New Mexico  773  125  767  148  743  175
North Carolina  470  180  479  202  435  140
Oklahoma  3311  61  326  75  316  17
South Carolina  491  49  550  101  533  173
Tennessee  643  168  660  365  615  181
Texas  411  26  437  -61  430  26
Virginia  435  255  438  300  372  124
United  States  549  69  576  129  559  48
80The  Act  also  provides  that  the  payment  for  re-  to encourage  diversion even  if it were not  a necessary
quired  diversion could not be  less than 25 percent of  condition  :to be eligible  for price support  payments.
parity  per  pound  of projected  yield on the diverted
acreage.  During the  first  2  years of operation  (1966  By  1969,  the combination  of an effective  program
and  1967)  under  the  1965  Act,  the payment rate for  to reduce  production  and less than favorable weather
voluntary  diversion  also  was  at  25  percent  of  the  had reduced stocks ofcotton to the point where acre-
parity  price.  After the  first year, it was clear that this  age  diversion  was  no  longer  considered  necessary.
rate  was too high for voluntary  diversion,  because  in  Marketing  quotas  are still  in effect and, thus, prevent
the first  year  nearly  all cotton producers diverted  the  producers  from expanding cotton acreage  in excess of
maximum  of 35  percent  of allotments  permitted  by  their allotments.
the  program.  The  1968  payment for  voluntary diver-
sion  was  reduced  to  6  cents  per  pound,  compared  The  combination  of  legislative  requirements'and
with  10.5  cents and  10.78  cents in  1966 and  1967,  administrative  determination  resulted  in -a  program
respectively.  Even  so,  about  18  percent of the  allot-  that  was  more  remunerative  to'producers  than  the
ted  acreage  was  voluntarily  diverted.  Although  pre-1966  programs  when  higher  support prices  were
payment  for  voluntary  diversion  was  about  at  the  in effect.
level  needed  to induce  farmers to  divert,  20-20 hind-
sight  indicates  that  payments  for  the  required  The  size  and  distribution  of  payments  to  pro-
diversion  were higher than would have been necessary  ducers  was another  effect  of the cotton program that
TABLE  3.  PRICE RECEIVED  FOR COTTON,  INCLUDING  PRICE SUPPORT PAYMENT,  UNITED  STATES
Program  year
Item  -
- 1966  '  '  1967  '  1968
Total  cotton  allotment  on
participating  farms,  acres  15,126,712  14,902,763  14,907,868
Cotton harvested,  acres  9,552,000  7,997,000  10,175,000
Harvested  as percentage
of allotment,  percent  63  54  68
Production,  1,000 bales  9,575  7,455  10,822
Season average  price  20.84¢  25.60¢  22.5,
Value of production  $  997,467,000  $  953,627,000  $1,217,475,000
Price support payment  $  489,352,840  $  611,709,698  $  638,821,168
Total value and price
support payment  $1,486,819,840  $1,565,336,698  $1,856,296,168
Total price  received
per pound produced  31.06 ¢  41.99,  34.31¢
Parity price  41.89  43.10  43.03
Price received as percentage
of parity  74  97  80
81many  people  did  not  anticipate.  In  1968,  a  total of  incomes,  or  program  costs,  but,  after  nearly 4 years
nearly  450,000  producers  received  payments  for  of  experience  with  the  program,  the  effects of the
participation  in  the  cotton  program.  Of these, more  various provisions are much clearer.
than  15,000  received  $10,000  or  more  and  about
5,200 received.  $20,000 or more. The largest payment  Although cotton production  has been  below utili-
to any one producer exceeded  $4 million.  zation  since  1965,  production  potential  may  still
exceed  utilization  at relatively low prices if all restric-
Payments  proportionate  to  size  of allotment  and  tions  on  production  are  removed.  For example,  in
volume  of production  resulted  in  large payments  to  1968,  some  122,000 producers, with 7.2 million  acres
some  producers.  Such  large  payments  to  a  few  pro-  of  allotments,  planted  about  1.6  million  acres  for
ducers  generated  considerably increased  support for a  which  they  received  only  the  market  price.  This
limit on the amount of payment to any one producer,  acreage  was planted  despite  the offer  of 6 cents  per
but, if a  limit were  to be imposed, another feature of  pound of potential production if it had been diverted.
the  1965  Act,  commonly  known  as the  "snapback"  Some  of  these  producers  were  prohibited  from  ex-
provision,  would  become  effective.  This  provision  panding  production  because  of  marketing  quota
specified  that,  "If  the  Secretary  is  unable  to  make  penalties.  In  addition,  nearly  4.5  million  acres were
available  to  all  cooperators  the  full  amount  of the  planted  by producers whose  plantings did not exceed
price  support  to  which  they would otherwise  be  en-  the  acreage  on  which  they  received  price  support
titled  ...  price support to cooperators  shall be made  payments.  Some of this cotton would not have  been
available  for such  crop through loans or purchases  at  planted if price support  payments were not available.
such  level  not  less  than  65  percent  of parity  . . ."  On  the  other  hand,  on  some  farms  the  acreage  was
Thus,  unless the basic  legislation is  changed,  a limita-  reduced  because  farmers chose  to divert  for 6 cents a
tion  on  payments  to  individual  cotton  producers  pound.
would be meaningless.
Thus,  the  need  remains to find  ways to  adjust  an
As  indicated  earlier,  the  1965  Act  was  enacted  industry  with  too  much capacity  to  a  new  level  of
under  stress of surpluses and need  for haste. The Act  output  and prices.  Part  of the adjustment  may come
included  several  features  specifically  applicable  to  as  a  result  of  improved  technology,  thus  lowering
cotton.  Little  time  was  available  for  analysis  of the  costs; another  from  shifting production  to lower cost
effects  of  the  program  on  cotton  production,  farm  areas.
82